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Introduction
How Can Management Be Relied Upon to Comply with Rules, Principles and Procedures?
Paradoxes  of  Principles  Based  Regulation  are  considered  to  include  the  interpretative, 
communicative, compliance, supervisory and enforcement, internal management, ethical and trust 
paradoxes.1 This paper will focus on how the paradoxes related to communication, interpretation 
and compliance could be overcome as a means of fostering trust between internal management. It is 
argued2 that trust is not only required before principles based regulation can operate, but that it also 
constitutes the foundation of principles based regulation – an element which “it alone cannot create 
– though it can facilitate its development.” The elements relating to communication, interpretation 
and compliance constitute the focus of study given the vital nature of their roles in facilitating the 
development  of  trust.  Furthermore,  the  success  of  these  components  would  also  facilitate  the 
effectiveness  of  supervision  and  the  development  of  ethics  and  trust  within  the  internal 
management. Even though trust is considered to be the “ultimate” paradox, it could also be argued 
that interpretative elements and communication could be placed on equal footing – although they 
could never  assume a higher  ranked status  than trust.  Where trust  exists  between management, 
could principles based regulation still operate where communication/interpretative difficulties exist? 
Interpretative  and  communication  problems  within  internal  management  would  only  serve  to 
undermine the trust which already exists between management. Whilst the pre-existence of trust is 
of fundamental importance, its development and sustenance are also equally important. For such 
reasons  factors  which  would  serve  to  undermine  its  development  and  sustenance,  should  be 
accorded utmost attention – and it is for this very purpose that the frequency of communication 
between management serves as a crucial means of overcoming problems related to interpretation, as 
well as fostering trust between management. Compliance also constitutes a focal point in the study 
since it serves as a medium through which trust can be fostered. The link between interpretation, 
communication and compliance is illustrated thus: 
“Compliance is meaningless, or rather has contested meanings, in the absence of some commonly 
accepted understanding of the way regulatory requirements should be interpreted and applied.”3 
The paper will also illustrate that too much information could result in over compliance—which 
could  result  in  undesired  outcomes.  Within  this  context,  the  frequency of  exchange  of  quality 
information is to be distinguished from the transmission of voluminous “irrelevant” or misleading 
information.
In illustrating why responsive and negotiating strategies are more effective than deterrence based 
strategies—where the facilitation of compliance with rules and principles are concerned, the first 
section of this paper will commence with a section which focuses on the role of moral judgement in 
the implementation of deterrence measures and responsive regulatory strategies. The second section 
then considers the role played by fairness and justice in the facilitation of compliance with the law. 
The  third  section  analyses  and  elaborates  on  techniques  which  are  employed  in  facilitating 
regulatory  compliance  whilst  the  need  and  reasons  for  a  pro  active  approach  to  regulation  is 
considered in section four. Section five highlights how communication and interpretation problems 
which are associated with principles based regulation and meta-regulation could be resolved. In so 
doing, it addresses the main elements which are vital to ensuring that the “ultimate” paradox and 
element, namely trust, is not only sustained but also developed.
A. Deterrence Measures and Responsive Regulatory Strategies
Deterrence measures are exemplified by measures such as penalties and fines whilst  responsive 
regulatory strategies are aimed at optimising a combination of cooperative and punitive strategies. It 
is argued4 that  the advantage which responsive regulatory strategies offer,  in contrast  to simple 
deterrence measures, lies in the fact that whilst simple deterrence frequently fails  to induce the 
required commitment to comply with rules and procedures (owing to lack of consideration being 
accorded  to  moral  issues/moral  judgement),  responsive  regulatory  strategies  “leverage  the 
deterrence  impact  of  their  enforcement  strategies  with  moral  judgement.”5 However,  it  is  also 
argued that political support is required as a means of justifying the moral seriousness of the law 
which is to be enforced – otherwise a “compliance trap” would be created.6
Other  forms  of  “compliance  traps”  which  could  occur  even where regulators  are  not  “actively 
seeking to improve business compliance”7 include those related to over compliance – as illustrated 
where penalties or fines are simply raised as means of justifying the seriousness of certain crimes.
Principles serve as a means of introducing some degree of fairness and morality into the regulatory 
and standard setting process without contributing to the same level of “over compliance” – as that 
which arises where fines are imposed.
B. Facilitating Compliance Through Fairness and Justice
The important role played by fairness and justice in facilitating compliance with the law has been 
highlighted by various sources in the literature. 
According  to  Haines  and  Gurney,  “regulatory  strategies  aimed  at  encouraging  organizational 
behaviour  that  extends  beyond  compliance  must  be  underpinned  by  a  rational  enforcement 
strategy”.8 Furthermore, they argue that “a graduated approach to enforcement—which signals to 
the regulated that the regulator is fair but tough, is needed.”
A number of intermediate categories are considered to exist on the “continuum between rules and 
discretion”—according  to  Schneider.9 He  also  provides  some  examples  of  such  intermediate 
categories by way of reference to policies and principles. A principle is defined as “a standard that is 
to be observed,  not because it  will  advance or secure an economic,  political  or social  situation 
deemed desirable, but because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of 
morality.”10
Whilst principles are considered as a means of introducing fairness, the potential for discretion to 
generate  injustice  and  abuse  within  the  system  is  acknowledged  by  many  authorities  on  the 
literature.  Different  perceptions  attributed  to  discretion  are  highlighted  by  Hawkins  through  a 
reference to perspectives put forward by Handler and Davis.11 Discretion is considered by Davis to 
be problematic where it is insufficiently governed by rules.12 His perception of discretion as an 
individualistic  activity13 is  quite  significant  in  the  sense that  this  would  appear  to  suggest  that 
greater  accountability  would  be  fostered  as  a  result  of  the  ability  to  trace  the  decision  maker. 
However Davis’ perception of discretion is considered (by Hawkins) to be less positive than that of 
Handler’s more positive approach – even though Hawkins highlights the fact that both Davis and 
Handler acknowledge the potential for injustice within discretionary based systems.14
Where a decision is reached by a group of individuals—in contrast to an individual decision, should 
this infer a greater scope for accountability or fairness (in the sense that more people will be held 
accountable for the decision) and less scope for injustice (in arriving at that decision)? Baldwin 
argues that even if responsibility for mediation is clearly and uncontentionally allocated, serious 
issues  of  democratic  legitimacy  and  accountability  may  still  arise.15 His  concept  of  “thick 
proceduralisation”, that is, “processes in which mediators can play an enabling role by translating 
the messages and logics of various systems or groups so that others can understand and so that 
communication can be facilitated across different systems and groups” was advanced in the hope 
that  parties  with  differing  views  could  effectively  engage  in  the  deliberation  process.  16 The 
penultimate section of this paper will address how frequent meetings and for a—whereby frequent 
exchange of views and ideas could be facilitated, could mitigate the doubts surrounding such a 
concept.
C. Techniques For Facilitating Regulatory Compliance
Techniques considered to maximise regulatory compliance include:17
- Outcome based regulations
- Pyramid approaches to enforcement
- Methods aimed at fostering a compliance culture (such as various forms of management 
systems which are designed to encourage regulatees to go “beyond compliance” 
Outcome based regulations 
“Principles provide the framework in which firms can organize their own processes to achieve the 
outcomes the regulator seeks—the regulator in turn, depends on firms to adopt an attitude to the 
regulatory regime (which is one which aims to go beyond minimal compliance with rules).”18
The contrast between “forward looking, economistic and rational choice models” which focus on 
outcomes and those outcomes which focus on the effects of the perceived fairness of the processes 
which  lead  to  outcomes,  has  been  highlighted.19 Whilst  the  notion  that  a  consideration  of  the 
fairness (of the processes experienced) might influence and impact future behaviour to a greater 
extent  than  looking  forward  to  expected  outcomes  is  controversial,  the  potential  of  subjective 
procedural justice to explain why people obey the law, is acknowledged.20 Outcome standards are 
considered to contribute to uncertainties—which facilitate over compliance, as well as inhibiting 
compliance21 with a particular or other areas of law.22 Such weaknesses attributed to outcome based 
regulations still do not overrule the fact that the degree of over compliance which may arise would 
still not be as high as that generated through an outright imposition of fines or penalties.
Pyramid approaches to enforcement
Whilst  the  effectiveness  of  pyramid  enforcement  strategies  which  are  most  effective  “when 
measures available at the top of the pyramid are truly feared” has been highlighted, the dangers of a 
fusion between “beyond compliance” and “over compliance” have also been illustrated.23 As well as 
recent increased penalties which have contributed to the elevation of the height of the pyramid of 
enforcement  strategies,24 there  has  also  been  shift  towards  enhancing  the  deterrence  impact  of 
punitive  measures  through  greater  emphasis  on  the  individual  liability  of  directors  and  senior 
managers.25 
“Scholarly evidence and regulatory best practice suggest that regulators should generally implement 
mixes of regulatory styles or strategies to improve compliance – rather than relying on deterrence 
alone.”26 Furthermore, in making reference to the proposal that enforcement strategies tend to be, 
and should be arranged in a regulatory pyramid (with more cooperative strategies deployed at the 
base of the pyramid and progressively more punitive approaches utilized where and when more 
cooperative strategies fail),  Parker argues that the leading theory for explaining and prescribing 
such a regulatory mix relates to that of responsive regulation.27
„Pyramidal  approaches  to  enforcement  are  encouraged where non -  adversarial,  non – punitive 
enforcement measures aimed at building on trust between the regulator and the regulated are used in 
the  first  instance.  These  must  inexorably  resort  to  increased  levels  of  punitive  and  intrusive 
measures – where persuasion and cooperation fail.”28 Moreover, “trust in the compliance activity of 
the regulator must be verified and where absent, stricter enforcement measures should follow.”29
A determination  of  the  optimal  form  and  strategy  of  regulation  not  only  depends  on  legal, 
constitutional and cultural features of an organisation, but also on its historical background. From 
such  features,  the  degree  of  trust  which  should  be  accorded  to  an  individual  or  collective 
management, in addition to an allocation of junior and senior responsibilities can be established. If a 
particular manager or management has garnered formidable reputation over the years, the level of 
trust accorded to such should, accordingly, be high.
Further, those employees who are “well informed and well intended”30 could be delineated from the 
“ill intentioned and ill informed” based on their past performance and records at the company. The 
need for an evaluation of past records warrants greater levels of monitoring at any point in time – as 
this would provide a more accurate picture of the level of trustworthiness to be accorded to such 
employees.  Accordingly,  the  level  and proportion  of  negotiating  to  punitive measures  aimed at 
fostering compliance could be determined from such records.
D. The Need for a Pro active Approach to Regulation 
“Pro active approaches to regulation are those which can be considered to demand “not merely that 
companies state their lines of accountability on regulatory matters”, but approaches which compel 
that they are “called upon and induced” to provide regulators with: i) an account of the procedures 
which have been taken to enlighten themselves about their commitments to compliance; ii) ways in 
which policies on compliance are being developed and; iii)  measures which have been taken in 
response to ensuring that policies on compliance are being implemented.”31
Meta regulation is considered by Parker to be more pro active than strategies such as “responsive 
regulation”, “enforced self-regulation” and “smart regulation” to the extent that it, firstly, focuses on 
the “need for law, legal institutions and regulators to link the internal capacity for corporate self-
regulation with the internal commitment to self-regulate”—as a means of fortifying companies’ 
commitments to self regulation (as well as their ability to self-regulate).32 The pro activeness of 
meta-regulation, as argued by Parker, is also dependent on the ability of the law and regulation to 
hold corporate self regulation accountable – through an association between the “private justice of 
internal  management  systems”  and  the  “public  justice  of  legal  accountability,  regulatory  co-
ordination and action, public debate and dialogue.”33
Whilst  responsive regulation and enforced self  regulation are considered by Baldwin to  be pro 
active – to the extent that they provide “a degree of stimulation to corporate self regulation”, smart 
regulation is considered34 to consolidate on this stance through its implementation and involvement 
of a diverse variety of measures and parties in regulation, and through its engagement of responsive 
regulation across a wide spectrum of regulatory instruments.35
Even though meta regulatory strategies are considered to be more proactive than other strategies 
such as smart regulation, responsive regulation and enforced self regulation, the limits of such pro 
activeness are highlighted by Baldwin who, through an analysis of corporate responses to punitive 
regulatory  risks,  argues  that  such  analysis  “not  only  exposes  the  limitations  of  punitive  (or 
command or deterrence) regulatory strategies”,  but also brings to light,  some of the difficulties 
involved in moving to the alternative, more proactive regulatory approaches that have been recently 
favoured by its proponents.36
Furthermore,  Gray  and Hamilton  highlight  the  criticism which  is  specifically  directed  at  meta 
regulatory strategies - which relates to the fact that it is “generally phrased and out-oriented” – not 
only raising questions relating to how best to comply with them, but also consequently, resulting in 
greater uncertainty in implementation for the regulated.37
In this respect,  reference will  also be made to Parker’s distinction between “punitive” deterrent 
individual liability for regulatory risk and pro active approaches such as meta-regulation, which in 
Parker’s opinion, should result in compliance within organisations.38 Gray and Hamilton however 
highlight  the  fact  that  individual  and organisational  responsibility are  more closely linked than 
suggested  by Parker.  This  is  illustrated  by  way of  reference  to  Baldwin’s  distinction  between 
corporate and individual regulatory risks, as well as reference to the FSA’s continuing emphasis on 
the links between individual senior manager’s own responsibilities  and their  responsibilities for 
organisational compliance.39
Whilst individual regulatory responsibility is considered to facilitate a lesser degree of compliance 
than organisational regulatory responsibility—owing to its more punitive and deterrent nature, it 
fosters  greater  accountability.  In  order  to  counter  the  “non-  accountable  effects”  attributed  to 
organisational  regulatory  responsibility,  a  “lead  mediator”  or  “lead  communicator”,  could  be 
appointed – who would be held accountable for decisions taken by the group. The next section of 
the paper (section E) will elaborate more on this topic.
Based on their level of experience, senior management should have less interpretational difficulties 
with principles than junior and less experienced employees. Individual responsibility for company 
acts  or  omissions  should  naturally  rest  with  senior  management.  However,  clear  delegation  of 
responsibilities  should exist  at  all  levels  –  be it  at  junior  or  senior  levels.  This  would  be best 
facilitated by bright line rules. Functions and responsibilities assigned to junior management should 
not be so strategic that acts or omissions committed by such junior management result in systemic 
failures of firms. 
In relation to guidelines which could be used in determining the point at which there should be 
departure from the systematic application of rules—when these would result in the substance of 
transactions not being observed, such a point of departure should be determined by an objective 
representative body such as the board or a committee (comprised of independent experts – some of 
who  are  involved  in  managerial  and  supervisory  functions)  within  the  organisation  which  is 
assigned with the task of systems communication at  all  levels within the organisation. In cases 
where an immediate clarification of such a point of departure from application of “bright lines 
rules”  is  required,  the  responsible  manager  for  the  relevant  department  should  take  action  as 
deemed appropriate.
A combination of bright line rules and high level principles would generally and respectively, be 
best applicable to junior and senior management. Hence senior management with good reputable 
background are likely to respond better (than junior management) to negotiative measures which 
are  founded,  to  a  greater  extent,  on  principles  –  in  matters  related  to  compliance  with  such 
principles.
With the desired combination of bright lines rules and principles, we commence with an approach 
involving detailed rules—whose application commences from junior level and is discontinued at the 
point of unfeasibility in giving due consideration to the substance of the transactions. The point at 
which  the  application  of  such  detailed  rules  is  to  be  discontinued  being  the  task  of  senior 
management. Senior management employs judgement and discretion in arriving at such a decision. 
At senior management level,  a greater proportion of principles exist  (than rules) since strategic 
decisions, to a greater extent, involve a significant degree of judgement and discretion. The second 
approach principally consists of principles—with a focus on the outcomes to be achieved rather 
than the incorporation of detailed rules. Under this approach, junior management undertakes greater 
responsibility for the interpretation of principles since less detailed rules constitute the focus – than 
is the case under the first approach.
The  first  approach  (which  commences  with  and  involves  more  detailed  rules),  offers  more 
advantages—not only because it facilitates greater accountability, but because it also provides more 
guidelines on how compliance with responsive or meta-regulatory strategies could be best achieved. 
Since both approaches (rules to principles and a focus on principles) eventually achieve the same 
desired  outcomes,  that  which  offers  better  guidelines  on  compliance,  along  with  greater 
accountability, is naturally preferred.
E. Resolving Communication Problems Associated With Principles Based Regulation40 
and  Meta Regulation
“Compliance is meaningless, or rather has contested meanings, in the absence of some commonly 
accepted understanding of the way regulatory requirements should be interpreted and applied.”41
Two issues (which are largely attributed to the pro active nature of meta-regulation), are highlighted 
by Baldwin as presenting challenges to the advocates of meta regulation.42 The first involves the 
concerns raised by Luhmann and Teubner, who from a systems theory perspective, have illustrated 
the difficulties which social sub systems43 are likely to encounter in effectively communicating—
such communication problems owing to the fact that such sub systems are embedded in their own 
“self-referential” way of understanding the world.44 
The second relates not only to the development of meta-regulation, but also to the stimulation of 
self-regulation  in  such a  way which  “produces  coherence  and harmony between corporate  and 
social ends –rather than confusion and conflict.”
Baldwin’s concept of “thick proceduralisation”, that is, “processes in which mediators can play an 
enabling role by translating the messages and logics of various systems or groups so that others can 
understand and so that communication can be facilitated across different systems and groups” was 
advanced in the hope that parties with differing views could effectively engage in the deliberation 
process. 45
Challenges faced by the above concept include:46
i) Resolving the question relating to the choice of lead mediator and translator – Should it 
be the regulator, the corporation, a pressure group or other private/public body?
ii) The fear of substituting “first order discussions” with mediation contests, confusions and 
fragmentations.
iii) The contention that “clearly and uncontentiously allocated” responsibility for mediation 
will not necessarily resolve significant problems related to accountability and legitimacy.
Having drawn similar weaknesses attributed to Principles Based Regulation and Meta Regulation, 
namely, communication problems, how are such problems to be overcome? Furthermore, how is 
coherence and consistency in the interpretation of rules, effective communication of the results of 
such an interpretation to be facilitated between management? 
In  highlighting  means  whereby meta  regulation  could  be  harnessed  effectively  and  permeated 
within an organisation, Parker not only refers to empirical evidence which corroborates such a need, 
but also draws attention to the fact that “self regulation systems are ineffectual unless they connect 
to corporate culture and seek to engage employee commitment, participation, values and identity.”47 
Two principal ways through which, according to Parker, connection with employee values, cultures 
and  self-identities  in  an  organisation’s  management  of  compliance  should  be  achieved,  are  as 
follows:48
- “Through  the  methodology  and  general  approach  that  self  regulation  professionals  and 
senior management take in designing and implementing self-regulatory systems (which also 
has implications for what the law and regulator require of corporate compliance systems) 
and 
- Through the  design and integration  of  compliance  into  employee  discipline  and reward 
systems – since this is the point at which the organisation most explicitly exercises its power 
over employees.”
As already re-iterated earlier on in the paper, a combination of bright line rules should operate at 
lower  level  of  management—whilst  high  level  principles  should  operate  at  senior  level.  In 
addressing  the  above  challenges  faced  by Baldwin’s  concept,  each  organisation  (whether  such 
organisation  or  body is  a  pressure  group,  private  or  public  body)  should  be  represented  on  a 
company  or  enterprises’  board  or  constitute  part  of  the  supervisory  committee.  A 
representative/representatives of the regulator should also attend board meetings or ensure that they 
are  well  informed  (as  frequently  and  as  feasible  as  possible)  about  developments  within  an 
enterprise, communication and results of meetings, enterprises’ policies, procedures etc. Frequent 
meetings  and  timely  communication  should  eliminate  the  fear  of  substituting  “first  order 
discussions” with media contests,  confusions and fragmentations.  The representatives should be 
able  to  select  (through  votes)  the  most  appropriate  person  for  the  role  of  lead  mediator  and 
translator—having  regards  to  circumstances  which  are  prevailing  at  the  time,  circumstances 
governing  the  systems  and  daily  operations  within  the  enterprise,  the  level  of  competence, 
qualification and experience held by the candidates.
The  existence  of  a  lead  mediator  or  translator,  to  a  large  extent,  would  resolve  the  problems 
attributed to lack of accountability – given that such a person would assume joint responsibility and 
liability (even though at a greater proportion than that attributable to other members of the group) 
for  consequences  arising  as  a  result  of  the  group’s  decisions.  Given  that  such  increased 
responsibility is accepted and given that other group members also assume and accept some form of 
contributory responsibility for possible consequential liabilities (which accords with proportionate 
increases in the level of fines imposed on each member), members within the group would also 
strive  towards  ensuring  that  decisions  are  taken  with  utmost  level  of  due  diligence  and  that 
members work on a more cooperative basis—rather than a culture of “passing on the buck” to the 
lead mediator/communicator. Where such conditions exist and operate, “clear and uncontentiously 
allocated” responsibilities should facilitate accountability and legitimacy.
In concluding this section,  and with reference to the statement by Parker that  “responsibility is 
internalised when the entire corporation is opened up to a broader deliberative democracy”, three 
strategies  highlighted  by  Parker,  through  which  this  could  be  achieved  and  through  which 
compliance could be incorporated and permeated within management processes, are as follows: 49
- i)  The  “bottom  up”  approach  to  self-regulation  whereby  “responsible  corporate  self-
regulators  use  employees’  cultures,  values  and  self-identities  to  build  organizational 
integrity.”
- ii) The “opening out” approach to self-regulation in which “stakeholder concerns and values 
have become an internal issue to be decisively addressed - and not an issue to be ignored.”50
- iii)The systems approach to corporate responsibility which “emphasises the importance of 
internal discipline, justice, self-regulation and self-evaluation systems within the entire self- 
management of the organisation.”
F. Conclusion
Having considered the merits of principles and negotiating approaches in maximising the potential 
to comply,  the need for an incorporation of a degree of bright line rules also becomes evident. 
Bright line rules would not only facilitate greater accountability – particularly in respect of clear 
delegation  and  responsibilities,  but  would  also  reduce  the  possibilities  of  discretionary  based 
decisions (and particularly group decisions), generating any abuse or injustice within the system and 
during the decision making process.
As highlighted and demonstrated in the paper,  “Risk Monitoring Tools in Bank Regulation and 
Supervision: Developments Since the Collapse of Barings Plc”, detailed rules could still operate 
within a system of principles based regulation. It was also re-iterated in this paper that in addressing 
the issues raised by principles based regulation, the extent to which such issues can be resolved, to a 
large extent, depends on adequate compliance with Basel Core Principle 17 (for effective banking 
supervision)  –  and  particularly  on  the  implementation,  design  and  compliance  with  “clear 
arrangements for delegating authority and responsibility.”
“Responsibility is internalised where an enterprise is subject to “deliberative democracy” through 
the  consideration  and  incorporation  of  employee  values—with  which  the  enterprise  can  build 
organizational  integrity.”,  through   a  consideration  of  “legitimate  stakeholder  perspectives  and 
external values”, and through the systems approach to corporate responsibility which re-iterates the 
importance of “internal discipline, justice, self-regulation and self-evaluation systems.”
Furthermore, the key to successfully building trust in management, not only lies with the facilitation 
of compliance through fairness and justice, the techniques employed in achieving such an aim, but 
also the ability to arrive at some consensus in the understanding of how regulatory requirements are 
to be applied and interpreted – that is, effective communication.
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